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Abstract 
Protagoras’ declaration that “man is the measure of all things” is 
conventionally discussed in the context of epistemology. There 
was, however, a communal or social dimension to this even in 
ancient Greece. In the unfolding process of time, this latter 
dimension assumed greater intensity and expanded 
systematically into all aspects of human relations. The centrality 
of money in these relations speaks to the transition from “man is 
the measure of all things” to money is the measure of all things. 
It is precisely this thesis that the present essay proposes to 
defend. 
 
1. Introduction: Money is the measure of all things 
 
Cattle were central in various social transactions of ancient Greece. This 
practice is now obsolete in contemporary Greece. Yet, the same practice – 
was common especially from Central to Southern Africa from time 
immemorial. The crucial importance of cattle in the same region of Africa, 
especially with regard to marriage custom, prevails even in our time. The 
manner in which the quality and quantity of cattle is computed in marriage 
negotiations more than suggests that they fulfill the function of measurement 
of value. In this sense they are similar to money. 
Through its gradual but systematic and sustained penetration into 
virtually all spheres of human interaction at family, communal, social, 
national and international levels, money has become universal in the 
conduct of human relations. Its claim to universality has been facilitated by 
its impersonality and conceptual homogeneity. As such it has become the 
standard as well as the measure by which even human value is determined. 
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On this point, Seaford, submits, in his discussion of money in ancient 
Greece, that “the result was a single thing of unique status, money, that 
could be exchanged for, and measure the value of numerous other things”1. 
Accordingly, it assumed a central role in human relations. The centrality of 
money in human relations is often confused with its putative indispensability. 
It is this putative indispensability of money for human survival that sustains 
the idea, from ancient times to the present, that “Money has become a 
distinct basic value that is implicitly or explicitly compared to other basic 
values such as birth or virtue or justice. … For the mass of humankind the 
only virtue is money, compared to which self-control, knowledge, rhetoric, 
speed of foot are of no account, for money ‘has the greatest power’.”2 While 
the great power of money is manifest even in our time, its centrality, as 
opposed to its indispensability in the conduct of human relations, is ethically 
and economically questionable. It is the concern of this paper to illustrate 
and question the putative indispensability of money in the conduct of human 
relations. Humanity still has the chance, to revert under qualitatively new 
existential conditions, to “man is the measure of all things” and thus explode 
the myth that money is the measure of all things. 
 
2. Protagoras contextualized 
 
Bertrand Russell, in his History of Western Philosophy3, describes Protagoras 
as ‘chief of the sophists’. In the context of other attestations to his 
professional renown4, this counts as a fair judgment. Although Protagoras is 
usually counted as a pre-Socratic philosopher5, his time of flourishing 
overlaps with that of Socrates6. In fact, Plato’s Protagoras purports to be a 
dialogue between Socrates and Protagoras.  
The Sophists were skeptics, who made their living by teaching 
“rhetoric”7, or the art of persuasion and argument. This teaching aimed at 
enabling “a public speaker to address an assembly in an effective form”8. 
Therefore, the Sophists did not necessarily consider moral considerations as 
implied by their calling9. They were therefore regarded as socially and 
morally subversive10 at the time Protagoras flourished. Indeed, the Sophists 
“professed to teach the art of Rhetoric, … There was, of course, nothing 
wrong in this in itself, but the obvious consequence - that the art of rhetoric 
might be used to ‘get across’ a notion or policy which was not disinterested 
or to promote the politician’s career - helped to bring the Sophists into bad 
repute. … If a man wanted to make money in the Greek democracy, and it 
had to be done mainly by lawsuits, and the Sophists professed to teach the 
right way of winning these lawsuits. … To this should be added the fact that 
they took payment for the instruction which they imparted”11.  
On the basis of this citation and, in view of our endnote 4, it is clear 
 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  24 
that the Sophists functioned in an already monetized society. Considering 
this and the fact that in the time of Protagoras the principal focus of Greek 
philosophy was shifting from cosmological and scientific questions to social, 
political and ethical ones12 - a shift which the Sophists affirmed13 - the 
question of the status, role and significance of money in ancient Greek 
society arises as a matter of course. This question, it would appear, has not 
played a significant role in the interpretation of Protagoras’ “man is the 
measure of all things”. It is our intention to interpret Protagoras from this 
point of view as well. In the time of Protagoras the principal focus of Greek 
philosophy was shifting from cosmological and scientific questions to social, 
political and ethical ones14.  
This shift of focus, and the insistence of Sophists like Thrasymachus15 
and Callicles16 that ‘might is right’ and that there is no impersonal standard 
to which to appeal in contests for power17, both propagated and reinforced 
a social stain on the Sophists. The stain must have been strong enough to 
make Protagoras admit the risks involved in proclaiming his profession18. 
The risks did not deter Protagoras from stating his thesis that “man is the 
measure of all things, of those that are that they are, of those that are not 
that they are not”. This thesis gave rise to considerable controversy in 
philosophical interpretation. The controversy revolved in part around the 
question whether or not this was an exclusively epistemological statement. It 
also revolved around the meaning of the term “man”. The third part of the 
controversy was whether or not the thesis was an axiological or ethical value 
statement. Referring to Protagoras’ thesis, Copleston observed that “There 
has been a considerable controversy as to the interpretation which should be 
put on this famous saying, some writers maintaining the view that by ‘man’ 
Protagoras does not mean the individual man, but man in the specific sense. 
If this were so, then the meaning of the dictum would not be that ‘what 
appears to you to be true is true for you, and what appears to me to be true 
is true for me’, but rather that the community or group or the whole human 
species is the criterion and standard of truth. Controversy has also turned 
round the question whether things-…- should be understood exclusively of 
the objects of sense-perception or should be extended to cover the field of 
values as well”19. 
 
3. Protagoras’ doctrine 
 
A classic statement of the supposed inconsistency of the thesis ascribes to 
Protagoras the view that “the various and conflicting characteristics 
perceived by men all exist objectively as material parts of the perceived 
universe”20. This is Aristotle’s contention, in his claim that “he [Protagoras] 
said that man is the measure of all things, meaning nothing but that what 
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anyone believes stably exists; this being so it follows that the same thing 
both is and is not, is both good and evil…., because often this thing appears 
noble to some, its opposite to others”21. An individual’s perception, then, 
becomes knowledge in the sense of it being an infallible apprehension of 
what is objectively real. This interpretation is primarily epistemological. It 
may be stated as the claim that knowledge is limited to the perception of the 
perceiver. Consequently, there cannot be a general, universally valid and 
applicable standard of knowledge. One of the problems with this 
interpretation is that it would endorse solipsism that precludes the claim to 
knowledge by others. But the mere experience of the others through 
individual perception is already the basis of collective or “objective” 
knowledge. Also, the interpretation is fertile ground for both epistemological 
and ethical relativism. 
In Vlastos’ estimation, Aristotle’s ‘report’ is rather a constructive 
inference22. He points out the corruption of Aristotle’s testimony: Aristotle 
draws a wrong inference because he omits “for him” after “stably exists”, 
and arrives at a view which is out of line with the well-authenticated views of 
Protagoras, who advances the view that “that which is believed by anyone is 
(true) for him who believes it”23. 
 
4. Epistemological implications of Protagoras’ doctrine 
 
The Causal Theory of knowledge, now a well-established trend in Western 
epistemology, vindicates the Protagorean view. The idea underlying all the 
various formulations of the Causal Theory is that one’s belief is justified and 
thus constitutes knowledge if the belief is caused in an appropriate way24. 
The ability to distinguish the actual state of affairs in which the belief is true 
from relevant possible states of affairs in which the belief is false, is a widely 
accepted interpretation of “the appropriate way”. Now, this distinction is best 
achieved by a method that is reliable in the circumstances25. The salutary 
point here is that a reliable method for distinguishing true beliefs varies with 
the circumstances. This means simply that what constitutes good evidence 
for a true belief is relative to the state of affairs prevalent in the belief 
situation. Accordingly, if my measure for p is based on a reliable method, 
then my claim to knowing p is rationally validated by the Causal Theory.  
According to Taylor, the charge of ethical relativism begins with Plato’s 
crediting Protagoras with the view that reality-in-itself is individual in the 
sense that I live in a private world known only to me and you in another 
private world known only to you. Thus, my perceptions refer to “realities” 
that belong to my private world to which I alone have access26. This denies 
inter-subjective discourse and thus leads to epistemological and ethical 
relativism. But the charge of relativism cannot stand because as already 
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stated above, the thesis of Protagoras means that “the community or group 
or the whole human species is the criterion and standard of truth”.  
 
5. Protagoras and ethical relativism 
 
The interpretation of Protagoras’ thesis as the epistemological position that 
there cannot be a universally valid standard of knowledge applicable to all 
situations, does have ethical implications. In the ethical context it means that 
morality is pre-eminently a matter that pertains to the individual. The 
argument against epistemological relativism is applicable to the sphere of 
ethics. Protagoras acknowledges justice as the ordering principle of political 
life. But justice cannot be known only and exclusively by one individual if it 
must be the principle and criterion for judging whether or not the well-being 
of everyone in the polis is protected and promoted. Therefore, justice as the 
principle and criterion of individual well-being within the polis must be 
accessible and comprehensible to all the individuals. Here the principle of 
universality is apparent though inchoately. For Protagoras justice is the 
manifestation of culture which is the human being’s best weapon against the 
“war against the brutes”27. 
Three factors justify Protagoras’ uneasiness about the charges of 
inconsistency and disregard for inter-subjective values. First, among these is 
his insistence that justice, piety and sophosyne28 constitute human virtues29, 
and that these are necessary for political existence30. Second is Protagoras’ 
humanistic ethics, implied in his claim that the life worth pursuing is the life 
ordered by justice and fellow-feeling. Third, he claims that wisdom consists 
in the power to change men (and the judgments or decisions of 
communities) by imparting what appears to them to be sounder or better31 
judgments32. What is better to them must be what is useful or pleasant to 
them, such that the result appears good to them33. What is right, good or 
useful then depends on subjective and contingent conditions prevalent within 
a culture and conceived by members of that culture to be such. What this 
suggests is a keen awareness of the social foundations of values. Nothing in 
this implies that dialectical dialogue between cultures and men is 
impossible. Rather, it provides the possibility for a shared inter-subjective 
basis for value systems by suggesting that moral conflicts between 
individuals be resolved by the activity of wisdom into a coherent set of values 
accepted by the conflicting parties34. 
 
6. “Man” versus money “is the measure of all things” 
 
We have already suggested that the historical context within which 
Protagoras lived was monetized. Protagoras’ thesis that “man is the measure 
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of all things” was posited in this context. The question is whether or not the 
thesis was a refutation of money as “the measure of all things” to the extent 
that money was the standard and determinant measuring individual status 
and worth in society. The distinction and separation between rich and poor 
was not foreign to ancient Greece. The struggle between these two 
groupings manifested itself, for example, in the rich expropriating the 
property of the poor and even selling some of the poor into slavery. Slavery 
was thus also a living reality in the life of ancient Greece. Against this 
background, it is fair to infer that “rich” and “poor” were indices pointing to 
social standing and worth in the polis. They also were indices of the relative 
political and social power between the two groupings. Money was the basis 
for the separation between the two groupings and the problems that arose 
between them.  
Seaford points out: “From the surviving laws of Solon we can gather 
that the polis is already somewhat monetized. Indeed, the Greek polis of the 
sixth century BC became the first thoroughly monetized society in history. This 
unprecedented monetization of Athens was probably a cause of the crisis 
faced by Solon. The central problem for him was that, as he put it ‘of wealth 
there appears no limit. Those of us who have the most wealth are eager to 
double it. This strange quality of monetary wealth, as unlimited, was 
emphasized by the Greeks. Of course greed and the accumulation of wealth 
are present in societies that do not have money. But the institution of money 
encourages an activity, the making of money, that is inherently unlimited by 
any practical consideration. Whereas for all save a lunatic there is a limit to 
the number of e.g. tripods that can be desired and accumulated, there is no 
limit to the amount of money that can be desired and accumulated”35. 
The problem faced by Solon in ancient Greece is somewhat a 
prefiguration – an irony of history – repeating itself and documented in the 
Bible story about those who were given talents. The individual who was 
given only one talent is reported to have buried it and later returned it to his 
master. His complaint that his was only one talent compared to those who 
received more than one, was not entertained at all. Instead, the returned 
talent was then given to those who had the diligence to increase and 
multiply the many talents that they had received. Probably saddened by this, 
the individual who received only one talent was censured for having failed to 
act on the understanding that “there is no limit to the amount of money that 
can be desired and accumulated”. Money then becomes the measure of all 
things in the sense that the activity of moneymaking is paramount in 
determining the meaning and worth of the human being as well as the 
natural environment within which the human being is situated. Thus a 
human being could be sold for money and become a slave in ancient 
Greece. In this way human freedom was subordinated to the primacy of the 
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moneymaking activity. Was this the precursor of the genocidal slave trade in 
Africa? Was Jesus not worth thirty pieces of silver for Judas Iscariot? The 
struggle for ancient Greece then was to put into practice and to strike a 
balance in the metaphysical tension between ‘limit and the unlimited’. This 
struggle has not died yet and it is alive in our time. 
The (implicit or explicit) claim of mainstream, neo-classical economics 
to be a science independent of ethics and politics has of course been 
variously criticised. I end with one of these criticisms. It will perhaps be the 
final irony of history that at the very moment at which the view of the world 
represented by neo-classical economics is congratulating itself on its global 
triumph, it is becoming apparent that this triumph is unsustainable, that it 
can do very little (apart from negatings its own basic premises) about 
impending global environmental catastrophe. The material prosperity 
attributed to the gospel of universal self-interest has been so great that our 
politicians, though generally aware of the dangers of global warming, are 
quite incapable of taking decisive action to prevent it. The freedom and 
unlimit inherent in global capitalism refuses to be limited, and the end of 
history will not be how Francis Fukuyama imagined it. The economically 
unlimited, condemned by Aristotle as contrary to nature, is now making 
nature uninhabitable. Despite all their faults, perhaps the ancient Greeks 
have something to teach us after all36. Aristotle’s condemnation was ethical. 
He censured the pursuit of the ‘economically unlimited’ since in practice it 
established the “sovereignty of money”37 and undermined the ethical 
foundations of human relations. And we draw from Protagoras’ thesis and 
Aristotle’s censure the lesson that it is ethically imperative to decenter 
money, to remove it from its throne of deadly inviolability, ubiquity and 
omnipotence and to restore “man as the measure of all things”. Against this 
background we turn to a consideration of affinities and differences between 
Protagoras and African philosophy. 
  
7. Protagoras and African philosophy 
 
Each of the three identified strands of Protagoras’ thought find an echo in 
authentic (indigenous) African thought. One prominent point of their 
convergence is on humanism38. The humanistic leitmotif in Protagoras’ 
thought is succinctly captured in his thesis that the human being is the 
measure of all things. A number of African thinkers, and we think correctly, 
have identified humanism as a foundational principle in indigenous African 
social and political thought and practice. It is evinced in Akan thought, for 
instance, by the guidance that the following maxim provides in formal 
political and legal deliberations: “onipa na ohia: mefre sika a sika ngye so; 
mefre ntoma a ntoma ngye so; onipa na ohia”39. 
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Wiredu provides two complementary interpretations to this proverb, 
both of which establish its humanistic leitmotif. According to him40, it means 
that 
 
a) all values derive from human interest 
b) human fellowship is the most important of human needs. 
 
A couple of principles flow from this humanistic ethos. One of these is the 
principle of the political sovereignty of the people,41 which states that 
political power rests ultimately in the hands of the people. As ultimate 
stakeholders in the polity, they have a fundamental right to be represented 
in the composition of government and in the determination of strategies 
meant for their welfare. Faithful adherence to the principle of representation 
is vital since it boils down to the recognition that the philosophical “social 
contract” is meaningful and has a chance of success if and, only if it 
acknowledges that the people’s right to life – in the terminology of John 
Locke, the “right to subsistence” – is inalienable and, therefore paramount. 
Rerum Novarum underlines this point in these terms: “since the domestic 
household is anterior both in idea and in fact to the gathering of men into a 
commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights and duties which 
are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately on nature. 
If the citizens of a State – that is to say, families – on entering into 
association and fellowship, experienced at the hands of the State hindrance 
instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of being protected, 
such associations were rather to be repudiated than sought after”42. 
Another principle is that indigenous African humanism upholds 
dialogue and consensus as the foundation of communal and political 
organization. According to Protagoras, a particular view or value remains 
true or good for a particular society until it is overturned by “better” views of 
a wise man. This implies both openness to dialogue as the route and 
process of exchange of views leading to consensus. The end result of 
consensus is the adoption of the “better” view. Our understanding of 
dialogue is predicated on Bujo’s criticism of the communication theories 
propounded by J. Habermas and K.O. Apel. Briefly, Bujo questions the 
“inhumanity and the imperialism of reason” that permeate the 
communication theories of Habermas and Apel43. As a counter to these 
theories Bujo offers the “palaver” as the indigenous African model of 
communication ensuring recognition and respect for humanness and 
assuring reason a place in the exchange of ideas. According to Bujo, “the 
model of the palaver, which … has proven to be more efficient in the 
African context, ought to be remembered. This model takes the interests of 
the individual into consideration in such a way that it can successfully 
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function at the micro-ethical level too. The participants of the palaver are 
indeed in solidarity with all those affected in the community, since they 
themselves live with and among the people and since they in principle do 
not exclude anybody from the discourse of palaver. Dialogue with the ethics 
of discourse could be fruitful for both models. On one hand, the procedure 
of palaver could work towards a more reflected reasoning, without 
abandoning its sage-oriented basis and its priority of humanness. On the 
other hand, the ethics of discourse will reduce its overemphasis on 
rationality in favour of humanness, in order to give the person as a person a 
privileged position. Only in such a manner can the ethics of discourse 
completely achieve that equality of chances of which it tirelessly speaks”44. 
The third is the principle of exchange. This is illustrated by reference to 
Wiredu and Ogotemmeli. Wiredu points out that government in the traditional 
Akan setting is better described as a coalition of citizens45. Accordingly, political 
power is set up for participation – not for appropriation – and the underlying 
philosophy is one of cooperation – not confrontation46. Participation and co-
operation rest upon the foundation of Akan morality expressed by the maxim: 
Obra ye nnoboa: Life if mutual aid47. Among the Bantu-speaking peoples the 
same principle is manifested in the practice of letsema translated with apparent 
lack of understanding as “work party”. Surely, a “work party” in the mining 
industry, for example, is constituted with the intention and, in the spirit 
fundamentally different from the philosophy of ubuntu in which the practice of 
letsema is anchored. Letsema is the manifestation of the principle of exchange. 
It is the sharing of labour, the exchange of the means and the instruments of 
labour, it is the sharing of mutual concern and care over widows and 
widowers, over orphans as well as the poor. It is the will to promote and 
protect the well being of others as a means of doing the same for oneself. It is 
indeed life in an extended communal family explicated by Nyerere in his classic 
Ujamaa. The African sage, Ogotemmeli, expresses this principle of exchange 
crisply in these terms. “The altar gives something to a man, and a part of what 
he has received he passes on to the others, … A small part of the sacrifice is 
for oneself, but the rest is for others. The forces released enter into the man, 
pass through him and out again, and so it is for all … As each man gives to all 
the rest, so he also receives from all. A perpetual exchange goes on between 
men, an unceasing movement of invisible currents. And this must be so if the 
universal order is to endure. The Word is for everyone in this world, it must 
come and go and be interchanged, for it is good to give and to receive the 
forces of life”48. 
In this citation Ogotemmeli lays bare the principle of exchange from 
the point of view of African vitalogy49. Against this philosophical 
background, the claim to private property, especially with regard to land, is 
rather odd for an African loyal to indigenous philosophy and culture. The 
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principle of exchange thus understood has survived the “independence” of 
African states. Its role in the development syndrome for Africa is yet to be 
acknowledged. 
 
8. The Global Economic Context and NEPAD 
 
Globalization is principally about the convergence of culture, political power 
and productive economic resources50 in the service of wealth creation. In the 
current global context, the vehicle for wealth creation is the global ‘market’ 
of capitalism. To the extent that it drives ‘the market’ upon which the 
structure of capitalism rests, competition is a core feature of capitalism. 
Wealth creation based on competition is the cornerstone of neo-liberal 
economics which holds sway in the global economic order that has co-opted 
the NEPAD, as indicated by its aims51. It is our view that globalization, with 
its competitive capitalist markets, has de-centered man for money as the 
measure of all things. 
This is because the notion of competition upheld here represents the 
pursuance of self-interest in an adversarial and exclusivist fashion. What this 
means is that competition as it is understood in the context of globalization 
refers to a contest between rivals in which a rational actor seeks his/her 
interest against that of another rational actor52. Under this conception, two 
scenarios are liable to rise. First, such rivalry makes human beings mere 
tools in the quest for self interest. Secondly, competition excludes one from 
the field of meaningful ability for self-interest seeking if one lacks material or 
intellectual wealth. Thus competition is the willful permission conduct oneself 
in human relations. It justifies the taking away of life and of human dignity53. 
Consequently, not “man”, but wealth becomes the measure of all things in 
the capitalist context.  
According to Presby, the philosophy underlying the thoughts and 
actions of prominent Western politicians who advocated the universalization 
of neo-liberal economics is provided by philosophers of capitalism like Ayn 
Rand and Garreth Hardin, who suggest that “the poor must rather starve 
and die than become perennial charity cases for those who are rich”54. The 
philosophy of capitalism then espouses an extreme methodological 
individualism that exalts the virtues of selfishness. In this sense, globalization 
furthers the trajectory of the Western thought that initiated and sustained 
slavery, colonial domination, the missionary invasion of Africa, and 
continues to sustain neo-colonialism55.  
We saw above that the attribution of ethical relativism to Protagoras is 
problematical. Neither can the philosophy of selfishness be attributed to 
indigenous African thought. Accordingly, the defense of selfishness and the 
substitution of money for man as the measure of all things, which are central 
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tenets of the global capitalist system, as they contravene both Protagoras 
and African thought. 
 
9. NEPAD and Globalization 
 
It is rather perplexing that the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD), which claims the status of an “African-owned and African-led 
development programme” committed to the self-reliance and sustained 
upliftment of Africa56, should affirm the philosophy, aims, and processes of 
globalization. This is precisely because the aims and philosophy of 
globalization vary from the African perspectives on the human being and 
society. We now take a closer look at the NEPAD document to establish this.  
The NEPAD document was endorsed in October 2001 by African 
Heads of State and Government meeting in Abuja, as the main 
development agenda for Africa57. NEPAD purports to constitute a 
‘partnership’ at two levels. Firstly, it is a partnership of African countries with 
the governments and owners of capital in the Western world. Success at this 
trans-continental partnership is desirable for two reasons. It is envisaged 
that it would change the historical relationship between Africa and the West 
in order to dispense with the “dependency through aid” that underpins it58. 
Next, this type of partnership is desirable to the extent that it holds the 
prospect of generating “capital flows to Africa, as an essential component of 
a sustainable long-term approach to filling the resource gap”59. 
Futrhermore, NEPAD aspires to build a partnership among African countries 
principally for the purpose of implementing ‘the Programme of Action’. This 
programme essentially seeks to derive maximum gain from the anticipated 
capital flows60.  
The document recognizes that Africa’s malaise of underdevelopment and 
exclusion in a globalizing world stems from centuries of unequal relations 
between Africa and the international community, especially the highly 
industrialized countries61. This relationship underlies the logic of African 
underdevelopment62. Section V of the document then outlines a ‘Programme 
of Action’ for restoring the integrity of Africa in its relations with the world. 
The main objective of the programme is to enable the continent catch up 
with developed parts of the world63; and its goals are:  
 
• To ensure that the continent achieves the agreed International 
Development Goals (IDGs)64. 
• To achieve and sustain an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
rate of above 7 per cent per annum for the next 15 years;  
 
The foremost political mechanism needed to sustain that growth is liberal 
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democracy65. Further, the document also supports the employment of the 
poverty reduction strategies as the most appropriate mechanism for the 
distribution of income and wealth66. 
 
10. Appraisal of some sections of the NEPAD document 
 
The NEPAD document is open to many criticisms, and we wish to dwell on 
four of these. 
First, for a document which claims to be African-owned and African-
led, it is rather casual on the role African culture can play towards 
development. It acknowledges “Africa's rich cultural legacy” and assigns to it 
the role of serving “both as a means of consolidating the pride of Africans in 
their own humanity and of confirming the common humanity of the peoples 
of the world”67. The problem with this rather “by the way” approach to 
African culture is that it undermines the pivotal importance of culture for 
political and economic development in Africa.  
Secondly, NEPAD is deeply rooted in neo-liberalist economics, which 
makes money rather than “man” the measure of all things. This is exhibited 
in three main ways in the document. First, by upholding of “economic 
growth” as one of its principal aims without qualifying this with the necessity 
to protect the well-being of every individual. Here the issue is both 
epistemological and ethical. Is there only one understanding and knowledge 
of economics, the kind of knowledge that is always and inevitable destined 
to seek “economic growth”? The question is somewhat rhetorical though 
urgent in view of the deleterious effects of development based upon 
economic growth as the decisive epistemological paradigm. Ethically, the 
imperative of economic growth is based upon the untenable presupposition 
that the life-giving and sustaining resources on planet Earth are infinitely 
unlimited. Accordingly, the acquisition of such resources in the name of 
economic growth precedes the ethical imperative to use as much as we need 
leaving the planet as good as we have found it and, ensuring that future 
generations shall also use and enjoy its life-giving and life-sustaining 
resources. This reasoning – manifestly against the “Lockean” proviso – is 
also fundamentally at odds with the African ethical principle that feta kgomo 
o tshware motho: if and when one must make a choice between protecting 
disposable wealth and saving human life then one must choose for the 
latter. This reasoning is consistent with the ethical interpretation of 
Protagoras’ thesis. Second, NEPAD de-centers the African in its endorsement 
of opening up African economies to external investors and securing the 
property rights of foreign capital. Third, Neo-liberal economic strategies 
pervade some of the key responsibilities which the signatories promised to 
undertake. These are:  
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(a) Restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability, especially by 
developing appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary 
policies, and introducing appropriate institutional frameworks to achieve 
these standards;  
(b) Instituting transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial 
markets and auditing of private companies and the public sector;  
(c) Promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its 
diversification into agro-industries and manufacturing to serve both domestic 
and export markets.  
(d) Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and 
resolution at the regional and continental levels, and to ensure that these 
mechanisms are used to restore and maintain peace. 
 
Clearly, (a) to (c) furthers neo-liberalist policies. It is suggested that the 
achievement of (d) may not even be for its own sake but to provide “an 
enabling environment”68 for business. Given this, the capability of the 
programme to address the needs of the Africans or deal with the core 
problems hindering Africa’s development is doubtful. NEPAD’s emphasis on 
integrating Africa’s economy into the globalization process, expanding the 
freedom of markets and of capital movement, was rejected by Nigeria and 
other countries at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial 
Conference at Doha, Qatar in 2001. It is most likely, therefore, that the 
success of the document will be heavily contingent upon the support of 
imperial interests. This greatly undermines its ability to address local needs 
and therefore secure local ownership and support69. 
Furthermore, the supposition that a ‘partnership’ with the wealthy West 
will rectify the existing unequal relations borders on fantasy. The Akan 
maxim, that ‘the hand that receives is always beneath that which offers’ 
succinctly explains why such a supposition is illusory, for if one takes the 
philosophy of capitalism seriously, one would hardly come to the conclusion 
that capitalists will offer someone resources in aid to enable the person 
ascend to the position where you can compete with them. 
 
11. Conclusion 
 
We have argued that from ancient Greece to the present, money has 
supplanted Protagoras’ dictum in interpersonal and international relations 
declaring with its increasingly powerful voice that “money is the standard 
and measure of all things”. 
Through NEPAD, Africa has adopted the strategies of neo-liberal 
economics and the processes and institutions of globalization as 
indispensable tools for the realization of its vision of self-development. Thus 
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Africa has embraced the exalted notion of the role of money in human 
relations because in our view, globalization, with its competitive capitalist 
markets, has de-centered man for money as the measure of all things. 
We have maintained that assigning such centrality to the role of 
money in the conduct of human affairs is both economically and 
philosophically untenable for the African future, as it is incongruent with the 
fundamental ethical principles that sustain African social organization. 
In our view, a framework for Africa’s development must envision existential 
conditions based in the ethic of “man is the measure of all things”. This 
however, requires recapturing the basic ethical tenets of the philosophic 
ethic of Protagoras’ dictum and that emanating from the knowledge and 
ontological systems of indigenous Africa. Such an orientation is more 
sustainable philosophically, as it yields a comprehensive vision of 
development that disputes the one founded on the ethic of competition. 
Further, it will position Africa as the subject of the struggle for its liberation 
from the imperialist and exploitative practices it has suffered, and continues 
to suffer, from its encounter with the West. 
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